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Abstract
The Internet has become a critical communication infrastruc-
ture for citizens to organize protests and express dissatisfaction
with their governments. This fact has not gone unnoticed, with
governments clamping down on this medium via censorship,
and circumvention researchers working to stay one step ahead.
In this paper, we explore a promising new avenue for covert
channels: real-time strategy video games. Video games have
two key features that make them attractive cover protocols for
censorship circumvention. First, due to the popularity of gam-
ing platforms such as Steam, there are a lot of different video
games, each with their own protocols and server infrastructure.
Users of video-game-based censorship-circumvention tools can
therefore diversify across many games, making it difficult for
the censor to respond by simply blocking a single cover pro-
tocol. Second, games in the same genre have many common
features and concepts. As a result, the same covert channel
framework can be easily adapted to work with many different
games. This means that circumvention tool developers can stay
ahead of the censor by creating a diverse set of tools and by
quickly adapting to blockades created by the censor.
We demonstrate the feasibility of this approach by imple-
menting our coding scheme over two real-time strategy games
(including a very popular closed-source game). We evaluate
the security of our system prototype – Castle– by quantifying
its resilience to a censor-adversary, its similarity to real game
traffic, and its ability to avoid common pitfalls in covert channel
design. We use our prototype to demonstrate that our approach
can provide throughput which is amenable to transfer of tex-
tual data, such at e-mail, SMS messages, and tweets, which are
commonly used to organize political actions.
1. Introduction
The Internet has become a critical communication infrastruc-
ture for citizens to obtain accurate information, organize polit-
ical actions [1], and express dissatisfaction with their govern-
ments [2]. This fact has not gone unnoticed, with governments
clamping down on this medium via censorship [3–5], surveil-
lance [6] and even large-scale Internet take downs [7–9]. The
situation is only getting worse, with Freedom House reporting
36 of the 65 countries they survey experiencing decreasing lev-
els of Internet freedom between 2013 and 2014 [10].
Researchers have responded by proposing several look-like-
something censorship circumvention tools, which aim to dis-
guise covert traffic as another protocol to evade detection by
censors. This can take two forms: either mimicking the cover
protocol using an independent implementation, as in Skype-
Morph [11] and StegoTorus [12], or encoding data for transmis-
sion via an off-the-shelf implementation of the cover protocol,
as in FreeWave [13].
This has created an arms race between censors and circum-
ventors. Many censors now block Tor [14], so Tor has intro-
duced support for “pluggable transports”, i.e. plugins that em-
bed Tor traffic in a cover protocol. There are currently six plug-
gable transports deployed in the Tor Browser Bundle [15]. Cen-
sors have already begun blocking some of these transports [16],
and some censors have gone so far as to block entire content-
distribution networks that are used by some circumvention sys-
tems [17].
Furthermore, recent work has shown that care must be taken
when designing and implementing a look-like-something covert
channel. For example, Houmansadr et al. showed that, when a
covert channel re-implements its cover protocol, the copy is un-
likely to be a perfect mimic of the original protocol, and a cen-
sor can use the differences to recognize when a client is using
the covert channel [18]. However, Geddes et al. demonstrate
that even running the cover application is not enough to avoid
detection by censors [19] – i.e., approaches like FreeWave may
be detected via discrepancies between the application’s regular
behavior and its behavior when being used as a covert channel.
They classify these discrepancies into three categories: (1) ar-
chitectural mismatches between communication patterns of the
application when it is acting as a covert channel vs. regular
operation, (2) channel mismatches between reliability require-
ments of the application and the covert traffic and (3) content
mismatches where the packet contents of the application dif-
fer because of the covert traffic being sent in place of regular
application traffic.
In light of this state of affairs, this paper argues that video
games have several features that make them an attractive target
for covert channel development.
There are many games available, enabling circumven-
tion tool developers to create a diverse set of circumvention
tools. The number of RTS games has grown rapidly in the last
few years, as shown in Figure 1. This growth has been driven
in part by the democratization of game publishing, as embodied
in game distribution platforms such as Steam [20]. Each game
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Figure 1: Growth of the real-time strategy game video-game
genre from 2010 to 2014.
uses its own network protocol and infrastructure, so the censor
cannot simply block all games using a single rule. Censorship
circumventors can use this large body of games to avoid a cen-
sor’s attempt to block any particular game.
Video games share common elements, making it possible
to use a single framework across many games. For exam-
ple, most Real-Time Strategy (RTS) games have the notions of
buildings, units, and rally points, and censorship circumvention
tools that encode information by interacting with these objects
can be easily ported from one RTS game to another. Many
games also feature replay logs and similar user interfaces, en-
abling covert channel frameworks that are only loosely coupled
to any particular game.
Circumvention tools can re-use off-the-shelf game imple-
mentations to avoid the pitfalls identified by Houmansadr
et al. Since games have features that make it relatively easy
to automate interaction with the off-the-shelf implementation,
circumvention tool developers do not need to re-implement the
game (or its network protocol), ensuring that the censorship
tool uses a faithful implementation of the game protocol.
Games provide good architectural, channel, and content
matches to censorship circumvention tools for textual com-
munications. Many game support both peer-to-peer and server-
based gaming sessions, so they can adapt to whichever is better
for the circumvention tool. Games must maintain synchronized
state, so they are loss sensitive, avoiding the pitfalls that Ged-
des et al. found in FreeWave [13]. Finally, games send frequent
small packets, matching textual communications.
Games have built-in security features that can support
secure covert channels. For example, most games include en-
cryption and authentication to prevent cheating. Many games
also support password-protected sessions, which can prevent
application-level attacks in which the censor attempts to iden-
tify covert channels by joining the game.
By lowering the development cost of creating new covert
channels, video games may create an asymmetry that censor-
ship circumventors can use to win the arms race against cen-
sors. Censors can respond to look-like-something circumven-
tion tools by blocking the cover protocol entirely or attempt-
ing to distinguish legitimate uses of the protocol from uses by
the covert channel. If developing such blocking tools is time
consuming, but the circumvention tool developers can quickly
move their tool to a new cover protocol, then there will almost
always be effective circumvention tools available for end users.
However, we must answer several questions to understand
the feasability of using video games for covert channels:
• Can video games support good covert channel bandwidth?
• Can we encode data in the video game so that the censor
cannot distinguish regular game play from covert chan-
nel sessions?
• Can we develop a covert channel framework that can be
quickly adapted to new games?
To answer these questions, we have built Castle, a prototype
video-game-based covert-channel framework. Castle encodes
data as player actions in an RTS game. Castle uses desktop-
automation software to execute these actions in the game. The
video game software transmits these moves to the other players
in the same gaming session, who then decode the message and
send replies in the same way.
Castle can be easily adapted to new RTS games. Our current
prototype supports two such games: “0-A.D.” [21] and an ex-
tremely popular (over three million copies sold) closed-source
game that we will refer to as “Aeons”. It took a single under-
grad less than six hours to port Castle from 0-A.D. to Aeons.
Castle is easy to port to new RTS games for two reasons.
First, Castle uses only features, such as buildings, units, and
“rally points”, that are nearly universal to RTS Games. Thus
the high-level architecture and encoding scheme can be re-used
across games. Second, Castle is only loosely coupled to game
internals. For example, Castle uses desktop-automation soft-
ware to execute game actions through the game’s standard graph-
ical user interface. Similarly, the Castle decoder reads actions
from the game’s replay log, which means that it does not need
to understand the game’s network protocol or other internals.
For many games, development is made evern easier by the ready
availability of code to parse their replay logs.
Castle offers good bandwidth for text-based communications.
Our current prototype provides between 50 and 200 B/s of band-
width, depending on configuration parameters. Castle has about
100x more bandwidth than other proposed game-based covert
channels [22–24]1 . With some game-specific tuning, the Aeons
version can deliver over 400 B/s. Even 50 B/s is sufficient for
email, SMS messages, and tweets, which are widely used orga-
nizational tools among political activists. There are also several
ways to potentially increase Castle’s bandwidth (see Section 8
for details).
Castle’s design makes it resilient to most classes of attacks.
Since Castle uses the underlying game to transmit data, an at-
tacker cannot use simple IP- or port-based blocking to block
Castle without blocking the game entirely. When used with
games that encrypt and authenticate their traffic, an attacker
cannot use deep packet inspection to distinguish Castle traffic
from regular game traffic. Encryption and authentication also
preclude simple packet injection or manipulation attacks. Since
games use network communication to synchronize their state,
they are loss sensitive, unlike some VoIP protocols. Thus Castle
cannot be distinguished from regular gaming sessions through
selective packet delay or dropping attacks. Finally, when used
with password-protected gaming sessions, Castle is immune to
application-level attacks, such as the censor attempting to join
the same gaming session to observe the player’s in-game ac-
tions.
We evaluate Castle’s security against statistical traffic-analysis
attacks by applying several previously published classifiers. We
1Despite the similarity of their names and their common use of
video games, Rook and Castle were developed independently
and have quite different goals. See Section 8 for details.
find that packet sizes and interpacket times of Castle’s traffic
deviate from those of regular human-driven game play by the
same amount that different human player’s traffic differ from
eachother. We also find that the Liberatore [25], Hermann [26],
and Shmatikov [27] classifiers cannot distinguish Castle traffic
from regular game traffic with success much better than random
guessing.
Together, these results show that video games offer promise
as a target for covert channel development and that video games
may enable circumention tool developers to gain the upper hand
in the arms race against censors.
Paper outline. In Section 2, we present the adversary model
that we consider in this paper. Section 3 provides some back-
ground on real-time strategy games, details the properties that
makes them favorable for use as cover protocols in covert chan-
nels, and explains how Castle makes use of each of these for
sending and receiving covert data. In Section 4, we provide de-
tails on our publicly available implementation of Castle. Fol-
lowing this, we describe our evaluation framework in Section
5. In Sections 6 and 7, we present the results of Castle’s se-
curity and performance evaluation, respectively. In Section 8,
we discuss the impact that Castle makes on the currently on-
going censor-developer arms race, modifications that may be
made to Castle for additional throughput gains, and compare
the primary design principles of Castle with it’s most similar
counter-parts. Finally, in Section 9, we draw our conclusions
and provide a link to a video demonstration of Castle.
2. Adversary and Threat Model
In this paper, we consider a network-level censor (e.g., an
ISP) who is able to perform analysis over all traffic that it for-
wards from or to clients within its network. It may also perform
manipulations (e.g., dropping packets, injecting packets) of the
network traffic via on-path or in-path middleboxes. The adver-
sary may also take an active approach and probe application
endpoints or otherwise interact with the game.
In this section, we overview the capabilities of the censor
that we aim to evade using Castle. We describe the resilience
of Castle to these adversary behaviors in Section 6.
2.1 Network traffic attacks
Passive analysis. We consider censors that are able to perform
stateless and stateful passive analysis of traffic at line rate. In
particular, the censor is able to perform the following passive
analyses to detect the use of a circumvention tool:
• IP and port filtering: The censor can observe the IP ad-
dresses and port numbers of connections on their network
(e.g., using standard tools like Netflow [28]).
• Deep-packet inspection: The censor may look for specific
patterns in packet headers and payloads (e.g., application
payloads indicative of a specific game).
• Flow-level analysis: The censor may perform statistical
analyses of flow-level characteristics such as inter-packet
times and packet sizes).
The first two of these capabilities mean that the ISP can eas-
ily detect flows related to the video game in general. For ex-
ample, if the game uses a specific set of servers (IPs) or ports
these flows may be easily identified. Similarly, game-specific
application payloads can reveal game traffic to the ISP. The last
property can reveal information about game behavior to the ISP
(e.g., rate of play). A circumvention system must avoid perturb-
ing these features to remain undetected and unblocked.
Active manipulations. In order to detect and/or disrupt the
use of censorship circumvention tools, censors may perform a
variety of active manipulations on suspicious connections that
transit its network. In particular, the censor may drop, insert, or
delay packets. Additionally, they may also modify the packet
contents and headers. The adversary may perform these ma-
nipulations to observe the behavior of flow endpoints to dis-
tinguish legitimate game traffic from the covert channel. They
may also use these actions to block covert connections (e.g.,
sending TCP RST packets, or dropping traffic).
2.2 Application layer attacks
In the context of detecting look-like-something covert chan-
nels, censors may take additional actions outside the scope of
standard active and passive analysis. Specifically, they may in-
teract with the application that the covert channel aims to hide
within. They may join game servers and observe games in
progress (i.e., who is playing with whom). They may observe
properties of the games (e.g., map state, player move behav-
iors) or join and interact with game players if the game is not
password protected.
Censor limitations. We impose some limitations on the
computational capabilities of censors. While they have a large
amount of computational resources, they are still unable to de-
crypt encrypted communication channels and guess high en-
tropy passwords. We also assume that the censor does not have
a back door into the game or game servers. For example, we
assume the censor is not able to break into the game servers
(e.g. by exploiting a buffer overflow or other bug). We also
assume that the operators of the game servers do not cooperate
with the censor, e.g. they do not allow the censor to see other
user’s private game state.
3. The Castle Circumvention Scheme
Castle aims to demonstrate that secure and low-bandwidth
look-like-something defenses are possible via interactive chan-
nels such as real-time strategy video-games. In this section, we
provide a background on real-time strategy games and high-
light key properties of these games that enable Castle to create
covert channels that generalize to the entire genre. We then
describe how Castle encodes, sends, and receives data.
3.1 Real-time strategy games
Real-time strategy games are a genre of video games that
center around the idea of empire-building. Typically, the goal
is for a player to assert control over enemy territory through a
combination of military conquest and economic maneuvering.
Below we highlight commands and features that are common
to a large majority of real-time strategy games (Table 1).
• Units: Real-time strategy games allow players to create
and train a large number of units (e.g., human characters,
livestock, machinery). Units may perform many actions
e.g., in 17 of the Top 20 best-selling real-time strategy games,
a unit can be instructed to move to a location on the map by
left- clicking it and then right clicking the destination loca-
tion on the map.
• Buildings: Players may construct a number of buildings
over the course of a game. Buildings are required to train
certain units and research new technologies. For instance,
barracks may be required to train infantry. Some buildings
produce new units of other types. In most real-time strat-
egy games, unit-producing buildings can be assigned a rally
point – i.e., a location on the map at which all units created
by the building will assemble. This command is available
in 17 of the Top 20 best-selling real-time strategy games.
• Maps and map editors: Real-time strategy games are set
in a landscape covered by plains, forests, mountains, and/or
oceans. Most real-time strategy games allow users to create
their own maps and modify existing maps for use within the
game. Map editors released by the publisher or the mod-
ding community are available for 17 of the Top 20 real-time
strategy games.
• Replay files: Players may be given the option to record all
moves and commands issued by themselves and other play-
ers in the game. This is used to replay or watch previously
played video-games. When this option is enabled, the game
writes, in real-time, all commands issued in the game to a
replay log that may be in a proprietary format. Replay file
decoders are available for 11 of the Top 20 real-time strat-
egy games.
In addition to the above elements, many commercial real-
time strategy games also possess the following networking and
security properties that are advantageous for use as cover pro-
tocols for covert channels.
Network communications. For scalability reasons, real-time
strategy games do not broadcast state information to all play-
ers in the game. Instead, they pass commands issued by the
players in fixed intervals (e.g., 100 ms). These commands are
then simultaneously simulated in each game client. This al-
lows clients to execute the game identically, while requiring
little bandwidth [29]. As a consequence, any data encoded as
an in-game command is received as such, by players at the other
end.
Additionally, while most real-time strategy games make use
of UDP channels for command communication, reliability is
implemented in the application layer. This makes many active
traffic manipulation attacks described in previous work [19] in-
effective.
In terms of network architecture, real-time strategy games
may take two forms, with players joining a common game hosted
on a game server (e.g., servers hosted by game publishers such
as Microsoft, Blizzard, Electronic Arts, etc.), or connecting di-
rectly to each other in a peer-to-peer mode. Therefore, any
covert channel system utilizing video games as a cover, can
employ whichever is the dominant mode of operation and shift
from one to the other if required, to evade censorship.
Security considerations. Real-time strategy games often im-
plement several security mechanisms in order to prevent cheat-
ing in multi-player game sessions. These include encrypting
and authenticating the communication channel that carries player
commands, verifying the consistency of the game state with
other clients in the game, and restricting access to game ses-
sions via a password.
These security mechanisms have several vital consequences
for their use as covert channels. First, since the game command
channel is encrypted, passive adversaries are unable to view
commands issued by players in a game by simply observing
network traffic. Second, the presence of authenticated channels
and game-state verification algorithms prevents active attackers
from using falsified game packets to interact with, or observe
other clients on the game servers.
Commonalities between real-time strategy games. Our pro-
totype, Castle, leverages the common command structure, map
design capabilities, and tools for decoding saved games and re-
plays generated by real-time strategy games. A survey of real-
time strategy games reveals that 11 of the top 20 best-selling
games of all-time also include these features (Table 1).
Feature Number of Games
Common Comands (MOVE-
UNITS or SET-RALLY-POINT)
17 of 20
Map Editors 17 of 20
Replay Decoding Tools 11 of 20
Table 1: Real-time strategy game features used by Castle and
the number of games in the Top 20 best-sellers of all-time that
possess them. [30]
3.2 Building game-based covert channels
Straw-man approach. One may consider establishing covert
communication channels via the in-game voice and text chat
channels. However, this approach has several drawbacks. First,
previous work shows that encoded data is easily distinguishable
from human audio communication [18,19]. Furthermore, voice
communication channels are fairly uncommon in the real-time
strategy game genre. Second, while game data is encrypted,
it is often the case that text communication channels are left
unencrypted. Finally, while one may expect a fairly constant
stream of human issued in-game commands in a real-time strat-
egy game, it is rare to have long text or audio communication
while playing the game. These factors allow covert channels
built on these approaches to be either difficult to implement
and extend, or to be trivially detected by an adversary, or both.
The Castle approach. In order to create a covert channel
mechanism that is general to the majority of games in the real-
time strategy genre, Castle exploits two key properties.
• Most real-time strategy games share a common set of ac-
tions. Specifically, the ability to select buildings and assign
a location where units created/trained in a building should
go. This location is called a “rally point,” and we denote
the command of setting the rally point for units created in
a given building by SET-RALLY-POINT. Games also pro-
vide the ability to move a selected unit to a given loca-
tion (denoted by the MOVE command). Thus, any encod-
ing that translates data into a combination of unit/building
selections and these primitives will be general across most
games in this class.
• Most real-time strategy games provide a replay option which
saves every players’ moves to disk (for later playback).
Therefore, all in-game commands are written to disk where
they can easily be read and decoded in real-time.
Castle consists of two main components to send and receive
data. These are illustrated in Figure 2. Sending is done by
encoding data into game commands and then executing them
within the game using desktop automation. The receiving pro-
cess monitors the log of game commands and decodes this list
to retrieve data sent via the system.
Figure 3 overviews how the Castle system could be used to
relay data from outside of a censored region to a client within
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Figure 2: Overview of data flow for sending an receiving in
Castle. Shaded components are implemented as part of Castle
while the others use existing off-the-shelf software.
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Figure 3: Overview of how Castle can be used as a proxy for
clients within censoring countries. A game client outside of
the censoring region acts as a proxy between the game and the
censored content (e.g., Web pages).
the region. The client first installs Castle (e.g., as a browser
extension). The Castle client then initiates a game through a
game lobby (or directly with the client outside of the censoring
region). The client in the censoring region can then encode and
send data (e.g., Web requests) as game moves that can be de-
coded by the client outside of the censoring region. The game
client outside of the censoring region can then act as a proxy to
retrieve censored content and send it via Castle to the client in
the censoring region.
3.3 Encoding data into game commands
Castle relies on the ability of the player to select units and
buildings and set rally points to encode data. A naive encoding
may consider selecting each unit and directing it to a different
point on the game map to encode a few bytes of information per
unit. However, in preliminary experiments, we observed that
this approach resulted in a covert channel that could not match
the properties of the original game traffic (moving O(100s) of
units to distinct locations is not a usual action for players).
Encoding in Castle is accomplished, without inflating the
amount of game data transferred, using the following scheme.
First, the participants in Castle download a custom map (dis-
tributed via game forums or stores such as Steam) which con-
tains either n immobilized units (e.g., units placed in unit sized
islands, within walls, etc.) or n unit producing buildings (e.g.,
barracks, stable, etc.). The Castle sending process then encodes
data by selecting a subset of these n units and executing either
a MOVE command in the case of units or SET-RALLY-POINT in
the case of buildings. While we discuss the encoding in the
context of units and the MOVE command, Castle is easily imple-
mented using either primitive.
Instead of using selection of each unit to represent a single
bit sequence, which would result in log2(n) bits of data trans-
ferred per command, we use a combinatorial scheme where we
select k of the n units, to increase efficiency. Intuitively, the se-
lection of k of n units results in
(n
k
)
different values or log2
(n
k
)
bits that may be transferred per command. We use combinato-
rial number systems [31] to convert log2
(n
k
)
bits of data into a
selection of k of the n units on the game screen. In preliminary
experiments, we found that the selection of a constant number
of units per command resulted in traffic which was more uni-
form than regular game traffic. As a result, we adjusted our
scheme to select between 0 and k units for encoding to increase
variability of packet sizes. Section 6 provides a more in-depth
view of how we evaluate our similarity to actual game traffic.
In addition to selecting the set of units, we can also select a
location for all k selected units to move to. Note that since we
select a single location for k units (instead of k distinct loca-
tions) this does not impact the data transfer size. Given a game
map with m = xmax× ymax potential locations we can addition-
ally encode log2 m additional bits of data in a given turn.
Assuming a map with n units/buildings, a maximum of m =
xmax×ymax map locations, and a game which allows for a max-
imum of k units/buildings to be selected simultaneously, the
game-independent encoding of covert data into a MOVE or SET-
RALLY-POINT command is done as shown in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Algorithm for encoding covert data into game
commands
function ENCODE(data, k, n, m, xmax)
r $←− {1, . . . ,k}
z1← READ(data, log2
(n
r
)
)
for i = n→ 0 do
if
(i
r
)≤ z1 then
z1← z1−
( i
r−−
)
selected← selected||i
end if
end for
z2← READ(data, log2 m)
(x, y)← (z2 mod xmax,bz2/xmaxc)
return {selected,(x, y)}
end function
function READ( f ile, x)
return next x bits from f ile in base 10.
end function
The combination of selecting between 0 and k units and set-
ting the location to move to, results in an average of(
∑ki=1 log2 (
n
i)
k + log2 m
)
bits transferred per command.
As mentioned earlier, one may achieve higher data-rates by
always selecting k units, however, this causes identically sized
commands and thus affects the packet size distribution.
3.4 Sending covert data
Once the covert data is encoded into in-game commands,
the sending process must actually execute the commands in or-
der to communicate them to the receiver. One way to do this
is to modify the game AI to issue commands as dictated by
our encoder. However, this is non-trivial since most games are
closed-source and viewing/modifying game code is not always
an option. Even when source code is available, the overhead
of understanding the game code and modifying the AI presents
a non-trivial hurdle. Given our vision of adaptability to the
large number of available real-time strategy games, we leverage
off-the-shelf desktop automation to execute the encoded game
commands. This opens the door to extending our approach to a
much larger set of games than would otherwise be possible.
Since the map used in Castle is custom made, the starting lo-
cation of all units is known in advance. Further, since units and
buildings are immobile, Castle is aware of their location at all
times. The location of units on the game map, along with the
list of commands to be executed is sufficient for Castle to au-
tomatically generate a sequence of key-presses, left-clicks, and
right-clicks to be made by the desktop automation tool. This
sequence is then passed to the automation tool for execution.
We note that, certain automation tools allow keystrokes and
clicks to be sent to windows that are not currently in focus.
This ensures that Castle does not detract from the user experi-
ence by requiring the game window to be in focus during data
transfer periods.Finally, since automation tools allow control
over the speed of clicks and key-presses, Castle can be config-
ured to either mimic human input speeds (lower clicks/second)
or maximize throughput (higher clicks/second). We investigate
the trade-off between these two variables in Sections 6 and 7.
3.5 Receiving covert data
Since the receiving game client does not have the same in-
game screen as the sending client (due to each client having
their camera focused on different map locations), directly ob-
serving the commands made by the sending client via the screen
output is prohibitively complex. Fortunately, most real-time
strategy games maintain a real-time log of all commands issued
in the game to enable replaying moves or saving game state. In
Castle, the receiving process constantly monitors this log file
for commands issued by other participants. These commands
can then be decoded back into their original covert data via the
decoding algorithm specified in Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2 Algorithm for obtaining covert data from game
commands
function DECODE(selected, (x, y))
size← |selected|,z1 = 0
selected← SORT-DESCENDING(selected)
for i ∈ selected do
z1← z1 +
( i
size−−
)
end for
z2← (y× xmax)+x
return (base2(z1)||base2(z2))
end function
This approach suffers from one minor drawback: replay logs
for games from commercial studios are often stored in propri-
etary and undocumented formats that vary from game to game.
However, reverse engineering the format of the replay logs is
made significantly easier since Castle only issues MOVE or SET-
RALLY-POINT commands. Therefore, we only need to under-
stand how these commands are stored in replay logs. This can
be done by simple techniques – e.g., sending a unit to the exact
same location multiple times allows us to obtain the byte code
used to signify the MOVE command, sending a unit to two loca-
tions in sequence (with each separated by a single pixel) allows
us to obtain the bytes used to denote the (x, y) destination
co-ordinates, etc. Further, for many popular real-time strategy
games, these formats have already been reverse-engineered by
the gaming/hacking community.
4. Castle Prototype Implementation
In this section, we describe our prototype implementation of
Castle. We prototype on two games to illustrate the extensibil-
ity of our approach.
• 0 A.D.: An award-winning, free, open-source, and cross-
platform real-time strategy game made available under the
GPLv2+ license, by Wildfire Games.
• Aeons: A best-selling (currently in the top 5 grossing real-
time strategy games of all-time), closed-source, Windows-
based real-time strategy game.
Our prototype comprises of ∼500 LOC and was coded in a
combination of Python and AutoHotkey (desktop automation)
[32] scripts. It includes the following components:
Custom map: To test Castle, we created a custom game map
for each of the two games. The map was comprised of n build-
ings packed as tightly as possible to facilitate our selection-
based encoding.
For 0 A.D., we created a map with n = 1600 buildings on
a single game screen, while for Aeons, we were only able to
have n = 435 (owing to larger unit sizes). For both games, a
region large enough to contain 16 bits of location data was left
unoccupied. This is used to assign rally-point coordinates to
the selected buildings.
Since 0 A.D. stores maps in a simple and readable XML for-
mat, the process of map creation was easily automated (via a
Python script). This was not the case for Aeons which required
manual generation of the map using the official GUI map ed-
itor. We are currently exploring automation options for map
creation in Aeons.
Data encoding and decoding: Code for translating between
covert data and in-game commands (and vice-versa) was writ-
ten in under 200 lines of Python using the encoding and decod-
ing described in Section 3.3. The output of the encoding code
was a vector of buildings to be selected and a single (x, y)
coordinate.
Desktop automation: We used the open-source desktop au-
tomation tool, AutoHotkey, to execute the series of commands
determined by the encoding scheme. Since the locations of
all buildings and units were known, selecting and command-
ing those indicated by the encoding was straightforward.
Reading recorded game data: We implemented code that
monitored the log file of commands issued (maintained by the
game), for both games. For 0 A.D., this information was al-
ready made available in a simple to parse text file. In order
to obtain this information for Aeons, the game replay file was
parsed using tools made available by the gaming/hacking com-
munity. The file was then scanned to obtain each command as
a vector of selected buildings and an (x, y) coordinate. The
commands were then decoded to retrieve the originally encoded
covert data.
Coordinate calibration: The isometric perspective of the
game screen posed a challenge during the decoding process.
Specifically, the presence of a viewing angle meant that a sender
may have intended to move a unit to the screen coordinate (xs,
ys), but the game actually logged the command as an order to
move the unit to the game coordinate (xg, yg), making this
the command obtained by the receiver on decoding the move
log. In order to avoid this problem, Castle goes through a one-
time calibration process of mapping on-screen coordinates to
coordinates as interpreted in the game. Note that the results of
this calibration process can be shared across game clients that
utilize the same in-game resolution.
5. Evaluation Setup
We evaluate Castle along two axes. First, in Section 6 we
consider security of the Castle by quantifying its resilience to
the censor-adversary described in Section 2 and its ability to
avoid the mismatches highlighted by Geddes et al. [19]. We
then study throughput of Castle using the encoding scheme as
laid out in Section 3. We also consider the effect of minor
game-specific improvements to Castle’s throughput.
For the evaluation in Sections 6 and 7, we use our implemen-
tation of Castle with a building-based map, using SET-RALLY-
POINT commands.The evaluation was performed on Windows
8.1 running AutoHotkey [32] for automation. The game was
set up in direct connect mode – i.e., the two players were con-
nected directly to each other via their IP address (rather than
through the game lobby). Since both players were on the same
(fast) university network, negligible effects of lag were experi-
enced.
Castle was used to transfer a randomly generated (via /dev/
urandom) 100KB binary file from one player to another. Net-
work traffic generated by the game was captured using Raw-
cap (a command-line raw socket packet sniffer for Windows)
with additional processing done using tcpdump on Linux.
We considered the impact of command rate (i.e., how long
AutoHotkey waits between each command) and the impact of
the maximum number of buildings selected (k) on the perfor-
mance and security of Castle. For this we varied the command
delays from 100 ms/command to 1000 ms/command. In the
same vein, the number of selected buildings is varied from 25
to 200. Additionally, to observe the impact of game-specific
modifications, we evaluated the throughput of Castle over the
closed-source Aeons, with and without any game-specific mod-
ifications, in the same settings described above.
In order to compare the traffic characteristics of Castle with
characteristics of the standard game, we gathered network traces
of regular 0 A.D. two-player games. These were also collected
in a similar setting – i.e., with both players on the same univer-
sity network and via direct connect. Ten traces were collected
(one per game played). Each of the recorded games was be-
tween 20 and 60 minutes long.
6. Security Evaluation
We now perform an evaluation of Castle against the network
adversary described in Section 2.
6.1 Resilience to network traffic attacks
Passive analysis. We first consider attackers with the ability
to perform IP and port filtering, deep-packet inspection, and
simple flow-level statistical analysis at line rate.
IP and port filtering: Since Castle actually uses an off-the-
shelf implementation of the game application, the IP address
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Figure 4: Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) statistic on the distribu-
tions of packet sizes. The difference between Castle and the
legitimate game flows is within the variance observed when
comparing traffic between legitimate game flows.
and ports used by Castle are identical to that of the standard
use of the game. This means that an adversary that triggers
blocking based on the destination IP (e.g., the game server) or
port number, will be forced to block all traffic to and from the
game being used as the cover protocol.
In the event that the censor is willing to block all connections
to dedicated game servers (often hosted by game publishers –
e.g., Electronic Arts, Microsoft, Blizzard, etc.), clients may still
utilize Castle in direct-connect mode, forcing the censor into a
game of whack-a-mole with Castle proxies hosted outside their
jurisdiction. Further, users may also easily migrate Castle to
another real-time strategy game whose game servers are un-
blocked.
It is also worth noting that blocking game flows is not with-
out costs to the censor, specifically with respect to political
good will and PR internationally. For example, blocking all
traffic for a given game, especially a popular game, may up-
set citizens within their country and reflect poorly on Internet
freedom within the censoring country [33–35].
Deep-packet inspection: When used with games that encrypt
their communications, Castle is resistant to deep-packet inspec-
tion, since the censor cannot decrypt the stream of moves being
made.
However, since Castle works by issuing only generic com-
mands (e.g., MOVE and SET-RALLY-POINT), it can easily be
detected by DPI boxes if the game communicates commands
in plain-text. Fortunately, most commercial real-time strategy
games perform command channel encryption (e.g., all of the
Top 10 best-selling real-time strategy games), making them re-
silient to such censors.
Flow-level statistical analysis: To quantify the resilience of
Castle against flow-level attacks, several statistical tests and
classifiers were employed. For each experiment, the Castle
configuration parameters that control the command rate and the
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Figure 5: KS statistic on the distributions of inter-packet times.
The difference between Castle and the legitimate game flows is
within the variance observed when comparing traffic between
legitimate game flows.
maximum number of buildings selected in a command were
varied between 0-1000 ms and 25-200 buildings, respectively.
First, the Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) statistic was used to
compare the similarity of human-game-generated traffic and
Castle-generated traffic. Figure 4 reflects the KS similarity
statistic on the packet size distributions of human- and Castle-
generated games and Figure 5 does the same for inter-packet
times. We make two observations from these plots: (1) There
is a high variation in the flow-level features of legitimate (i.e.,
human-game-generated) traffic. We hypothesize that this is be-
cause the traffic generated by the real-time strategy game is
strongly dependent on many parameters such as map and sce-
nario type, strategies employed, and number of players. (2)
Castle in many configurations, generates traffic that is well within
this variance. We find that while restricting the maximum num-
ber of units per command to under 50 and the command rate to
around 1 command/second, Castle generates traffic that is as
most similar to traffic generated by legitimate games.
Next, Castle was evaluated against several website and traffic
fingerprinting classifiers. The goal was to evaluate the accuracy
of classifiers, built for flow-level analysis, in distinguishing be-
tween Castle-generated and human-generated traffic.
First, each network capture was split into (20) one minute
long chunks. For each experiment, classifiers were given 20
chunks of Castle-generated traffic at a specific configuration
and 20 randomly selected human-game-generated chunks. Ten-
fold cross validation was employed for splitting chunks into
training and testing sets.
Since, in our experiments, Castle was used for the purpose
of file transfer, all traffic generated by it was in a single di-
rection. This makes it trivially detectable by some fingerprint-
ing classifiers which are heavily reliant on burst and direction
features (e.g., k-NN [36], the Panchenko classifier [37] and
OSAD [38]). We note that in a real deployment this directional-
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Figure 6: The performance of Castle in various configurations
against website fingerprinting classifiers.
ity would not be an issue as there would be requests/responses
from both sides.
Due to the directionality of traffic, website fingerprinting
classifiers that ignored directional information were used. These
included the Liberatore classifier [25], the Herrmann classi-
fier [26], and an inter-packet timing classifier [27]. All classi-
fier implementations were obtained from Wang’s open-source
classifier archive [39]. The results of these experiments are il-
lustrated in Figure 6. In general, the results indicate that Castle
performs very well against packet size and timing classifiers,
with only the Herrmann classifier achieving an accuracy of over
60% against multiple configurations of Castle. This is not much
better than random guessing.
Active traffic manipulations. In the face of active traffic ma-
nipulation attacks, such as probing, packet injection, and modi-
fication, Castle implemented over most commercial games faces
little threat.
Packet injection. If Castle is implemented over a real-time
strategy game with an encrypted and authenticated command
channel (e.g., any of the Top 10 best-sellers of all time), any
packets injected by an unauthenticated source are dropped by
the game-server. As a result, a probing adversary learns nothing
about the Castle games running on the server.
Packet modifications. Most packet modification attacks are
prevented by the presence of encrypted and authenticated in-
game channels. Additionally, since Castle does not require any
changes to the game or the hosting server, such attacks will al-
ways elicit the same response from both, legitimate game play-
ers and Castle users.
Packet dropping and delaying. Although most commercial
real-time strategy games make use of UDP as a transport, the
presence of reliability implemented in the application layer pre-
vents any threats from adversaries that drop, or significantly
delay packets in transmission. As a result, attacks (e.g., [19])
that result in denial-of-service for Castle users are not possible
without also affecting legitimate game players.
6.2 Resilience to application layer attacks
Highly motivated censors may perform actions outside the
realm of standard network traffic analysis and manipulation.
We consider censors that may interact with the game server
using custom game clients in order to reveal the identities of
Castle users. Specifically, censors may connect to game server
lobbies to identify Castle games and join these games to learn
the IPs of participating clients. For these cases, Castle provides
several defenses based on features available in the cover game.
If the cover game supports the use of password-protected
multi-player games, Castle proxies may host games using high-
entropy passwords distributed using, for example, a BridgeDB-
like mechanism [40]. Therefore censors without knowledge of
the password are unable to join Castle games and learn the IP
addresses of Castle clients.
If the cover does not support the use of password-protected
games, a Castle proxy may incorporate either (or, both) of the
following defenses: (1) The proxy may use standard game maps
rather than custom-made Castle game maps. This allows Castle
instances to blend in with legitimate game instances, making it
harder for the censor to identify which games to join. However,
this comes at the cost of lower throughput since there are typ-
ically fewer units in standard game maps. (2) The proxy may
still use a BridgeDB-like mechanism for password distribution
and require that any Castle client makes the moves correspond-
ing to the supplied password in order to receive proxying ser-
vices. In the event that a client does not supply this password
within some period of time, the Castle proxy may continue
playing the game using a standard AI. Therefore, even a cen-
sor that is able to enter games is unable to distinguish between
Castle games and legitimate player games.
6.3 Avoiding covert channel pitfalls
Geddes et al. highlight three key mismatches between covert
channels and cover traffic which make these look-like-something
circumvention tools detectable to external observers [19]. Here
we discuss how Castle avoids each of these three mismatches.
The architecture mismatch. Games provide agility in terms
of architecture that few other channels provide. They often op-
erate in client-server mode on publisher-hosted game servers
and in peer-to-peer mode in direct-connect multi-player games.
Our proxying approach can operate in whichever mode is the
dominant, and in the presence of blocking can even shift (e.g.,
from client-server to peer-to-peer).
The channel mismatch. While game data is typically com-
municated over a UDP channel, it is not resilient to packet loss
like other UDP-based channels (e.g., VoIP), thus clients come
with the ability to handle packet losses and retransmissions.
Further, they also guarantee in-order delivery and processing
of sent data. This makes it especially useful as a covert channel
for proxied TCP connections which require reliable transmis-
sion. Therefore, attacks that allow the censor to drop traffic to
levels which are tolerable to legitimate players (but intolerable
to Castle users) are not possible.
The content mismatch. Content mismatches arise when
the content being embedded in the covert channel changes the
flow-level features of the channel. Since the flow-level features
of real-time strategy games are strongly dependent on many pa-
rameters (identified above), they are highly variable. We have
shown that Castle, under every configuration, generates traffic
that is well within this variance.
7. Performance Evaluation
Without any game-specific modifications, Castle offers per-
formance amenable to transfer of textual data (e.g., tweets, e-
mail, news articles).2
Since each real-time strategy game has a limit on the number
of objects that can be selected for a single command, the data
rate obtained by Castle is game dependent. For example, 0 A.D.
allows the selection of up to 200 units for a single command,
giving us an average of ∑
200
i=1 log2 (
1600
i )
200×8 ≈ 65 bytes per command.
On the other hand, Aeons has no limits on the number of units
that may be selected for a single command but allows only ≤
435 objects to be placed within a single screen – giving us an
average of ≈ 39 bytes per command.
Throughput is also dependent on the time required by the
desktop automation tool to perform the actions required to is-
sue a command (i.e., click each unit to be selected and click
the target coordinate). We found that on average, issuing a
single command required between 300-350 ms. With no de-
lays between the issue of each command, this allows ≈ 3 com-
mands/second.
In Figure 7, we see the effect of Castle’s parameters on it’s
performance when implemented over 0 A.D. Specifically, Fig-
ure 7a shows the effect of increasing the maximum number of
buildings selected in a single command and Figure 7b demon-
strates the effect of decreasing the command rate. At a config-
uration where Castle may select up to 200 buildings in a sin-
gle command and issues commands with no delays in between,
Castle implemented over 0 A.D. is able to provide a data rate
of≈ 190 Bytes per second – requiring about 52 seconds for the
transfer of a short 10KB text news article.
7.1 Game-specific enhancements for Castle
In this section, we show that the performance of Castle can
be improved significantly through simple game-specific tweaks.
To be able to observe the impact of these game-specific modi-
fications, Aeons was used as the channel for vanilla Castle and
Castle with Aeons-specific modifications. The game-specific
modifications were introduced and implemented for Castle in
just under three hours by an undergraduate researcher.
The low throughput of Castle over Aeons was because Aeons
had larger units than 0 A.D., thereby allowing players to place
only 435 units within a single screen (as opposed to 1,600 for
0 A.D.). As a result, the throughput of vanilla Castle was only
≈ 38 bytes/command (i.e., ≤ 130 bytes/second) at best – i.e.,
with the maximum command rate of AutoHotkey and selection
of up to 435 units/command.
A quick investigation into the Aeons replay mode and save-
game files revealed that even the selection of a single unit was
communicated over the network and logged by other players.
We exploit this fact by creating a set of 2m units (256 in our
case) and mapping each unit to an m− bit value (i.e., a byte).
We then sequentially transfer the data byte-by-byte via select-
ing the unit corresponding to the byte to be encoded.
2The success of the voices feeds [41] during the Arab Spring
shows that in some situations textual data is enough to get in-
formation out.
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This encoding allowed AutoHotkey to issue commands at a
significantly faster rate than before (a command was now just
a single mouse click, as opposed to up to 435 key presses and
clicks). At AutoHotkey’s fastest mouse click rate and m = 8,
this encoding achieved a throughput of up to 3KByte/second.
However, in order to more closely mimic the command rate
and traffic generated by a human player, we add a delay of be-
tween 2 and 3 ms per command. In Figure 8, we show the
effect of this game-specific modification on the throughput of
Castle. From the same figure, we can also observe the effect
of varying the total number of units with vanilla Castle and the
Aeons-specific version of Castle. We see that increasing n re-
sults in a linearly increasing throughput for vanilla Castle, and a
logarithmically increasing throughput for Aeons-specific Cas-
tle. However, because the cross-over point of these functions
is higher than the game allows, Aeons-specific Castle always
achieves better throughput for Aeons.
8. Discussion
In this section, we discuss Castle in the context of its abil-
ity to provide deniability to users of the system and provide
extensibility that can tip the scales in favor of circumvention
developers. We also discuss various methods to improve the
throughput of Castle and compare the design methodology of
Castle with the most similar related work – Rook and Free-
Wave.
Deniability and ease of distribution. One of the advan-
tages of Castle is that the covert channel is largely implemented
with off-the-shelf software components with only a few hun-
dred lines of code dedicated to encoding data and desktop au-
tomation scripting. Desktop automation tools, are already com-
monly used by gamers and the game, game-specific mods, etc.,
are generally widespread enough to warrant little suspicion from
censors (e.g., Aeons is installed by millions of users).
Castle’s small core size also makes it easy to distribute through
hard to block methods – e.g., via the text body in emails and
even through instant messaging services.
Extensibility of Castle. Castle’s strength comes from the ease
with which it can be ported to new games. As an example, it
took a bright undergrad less than 6 hours to complete a basic
port of Castle over a very popular closed-source real-time strat-
egy game. Due to the availability of game-specific hacks and
reverse engineering guides in popular gaming forums [42–44],
completing game-specific enhancements in order to improve
the data rate of Castle, as described in Section 7.1, required
only an additional 3 hours.
Although individual game titles do not present a high collat-
eral damage, in the event that they are blocked, Castle presents
a simple way to convert each of them into an ephemeral and ef-
fective covert channel, with little development overhead. This
ability, along with the fact that every newly released title is a
potential covert channel, makes Castle particularly useful in the
arms-race that censors and developers are currently engaged in.
In particular, it is the first censorship circumvention tool to pro-
vide an asymmetry in favor of the developer (i.e., creating a
new channel is significantly less expensive than detecting the
channel).
Improving Castle throughput. In addition to making game-
specific modifications, Castle presents many opportunities to
increase throughput of the system.
• Parallel requests: Since most modern real-time strategy
games allow up to eight players to participate in a single
multi-player game, it is possible for one censored user to
decode content responses from up to seven proxies in par-
allel – achieving up to 7x downstream throughput. This
is particularly useful in the context of web data, where re-
quests are easy to parallelize.
• Content compression. Castle proxies may improve perfor-
mance by compressing requested content before encoding.
In the context of web data, the proxies may also pre-render
and compress content before sending them to the receiver
(e.g., as was done by the Opera mobile browser [45]).
• Trade-off throughput and detectability. Depending on the
level of surveillance in a given region Castle may expose an
option to allow users to trade off throughput vs. detectabil-
ity of the system (e.g., by increasing the rate of clicks in the
automation tool).
Comparison of design methodology. In terms of design
methodology, Rook and FreeWave are most similar to Castle.
Like Castle, Rook also uses games as the cover protocol, al-
though the goals of Rook and Castle are quite different. The
primary goal of Castle is adaptability – Castle is loosely cou-
pled to the underlying game, enabling developers to quickly
adapt Castle to many games. Rook is focused on stegono-
graphic security; even if the adversary is able to join the same
gaming session as two Rook users, the attacker will still not be
able to determine whether the other players are using Rook to
surreptitiously transmit data. As a result, Rook aims for secu-
rity against a very powerful adversary, but has over 100x lower
bandwidth than Castle.
FreeWave and Castle are similar in that they both work above
the application layer, mimicking user input to the application,
rather than the application itself (FreeWave uses a modem to
encode data into audio transmissions over VoIP clients). Simi-
lar to Castle, FreeWave also allows extensibility to other similar
applications. However, there are significantly more real-time
strategy games available for use as cover protocols than there
are VoIP clients.
To the best of our knowledge, Castle is the only covert chan-
nel that (1) appears to satisfy all the covert channel design prin-
ciples laid out by Geddes, et al [19], (2) provides extensibility
to hundreds of applications (games), potentially with only a few
hours effort for each, and (3) is evaluated for security at the ap-
plication and network layer.
9. Conclusions
In this paper we have presented Castle, a general approach
for creating covert channels using real-time strategy games as
a cover for covert communications. We demonstrate our ap-
proach by prototyping on two different games with minimal
additional development overhead and show its resilience to a
network adversary. We argue that the popularity, availability,
and generic functionalities of modern games make them an
effective circumvention tool in the arms-race against censors.
Specifically, our results show that Castle is:
• Secure: Castle is resistant to attacks such as IP/port fil-
tering and deep-packet inspection since it actually executes
the game application. More complicated and expensive at-
tacks such as traffic analysis attacks are avoided due to the
high variability of standard game flows.
• Usable: Even without any game-specific modifications,
Castle is able to provide throughput sufficient for transfer
of textual data. Additional enhancements make it suitable
for use as a web proxy.
• Extensible: Incorporating new closed-source games as covert
channels for Castle requires only a few hours of developer
time – including the addition of title-specific enhancements
for increased throughput.
The results presented in this work motivates two independent
future research directions. First, extending our work to differ-
ent classes of games which may enable higher throughput rates
(e.g., racing games, first person shooters). Second, integrating
the Castle approach into platforms to make it usable to users
e.g., via a Web browser plugin or integration with the suite of
Tor Pluggable Transports [15].
Code and data release: To ensure reproducibility of our re-
sults and ease comparative evaluation, our implementation of
Castle is available at https://github.com/bridgar/Castl
e-Covert-Channel.
Video demonstration: A video demonstration of Castle im-
plemented over 0 A.D. is available at https://www.youtub
e.com/watch?v=zpjZJuvMhDE.
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